A PLURALIST THEORY OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
*
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The Constitution is intimately connected with social “groups.” Although both the Constitution and the socially relevant groups have
changed radically over more than two centuries, at least one general
idea has been constant, and it is reflected in both the Constitution’s
structure and its deliberative background (“original meaning,” if you
will). My argument in this Article is that the Constitution assumes a
particular normative theory about groups in politics, and this theory
is pluralism. I am using “pluralism” to mean a political regime along
the following lines: successful government must induce all “relevant”
(i.e., socially important) groups and their members to invest in and
commit to government as a forum for their protection and for their
1
engagement in politics.
Part I of this Article will lay out the Constitution’s evolution as a
document facilitating the operation of a democratic-pluralist regime.
Part II derives from this documentary history and the original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause a pluralist theory of groups and
equal protection. Part III will suggest the virtues of such a theory and
apply it to some current cutting edge constitutional issues.
I. THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND ITS COMMITMENT
TO PLURALIST ENGAGEMENT
Even though the Framers held a variety of views about the nature
and role of social groups in governance, the Constitution as a document has had a stable understanding of their role. The Constitution’s relatively stable meta-principle is that all relevant social groups
should channel their energies into legislative politics, either at the
national or local arena. A vigorous politics of group engagement will
often be acrimonious, but a contentious politics is much better than

*
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John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
For useful statements of the normative foundations of democratic pluralism that are
roughly along these lines, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE
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feuds and strife outside of politics. Corollaries to this principle include the following precepts that ought to guide pluralist democracies:
• participatory deliberation, the ideal that policymaking should
be the product of open debate among officials accountable to
an array of different groups, all of which have formal access to
the institutions of deliberation and implementation;
• minority protection, the notion that government ought not be a
mechanism for majority groups to entrench a permanent politi3
cal marginalization of an outnumbered minority; and
• libertarian neutrality, or protections against government processes being deployed against minority group members, thereby
undermining their sense of security within the political regime.
For the purposes of this Article, with its focus on equality protections,
the second corollary, minority protection, is the most important, but
I shall say a few words about all three.
A. The Constitution of 1789
The Constitution of 1789 was drafted and adopted to replace the
dysfunctional governance structure of the Articles of Confederation.
Its most celebrated feature was the creation of a puissant national
government, while simultaneously preserving the States as centers of
power and accountability. For my purposes, what is most important is
that the Framers also grasped the essential features of pluralist democracy and sought to entrench it through the structure of governance.
2

3

Starting with THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell
1946) (1651), social contract theorists have opined that the core purpose of government
is to save us from the “brutish” state of nature by providing protection and peaceful
means for social interaction and dispute resolution. Modern commentators sometimes
forget the Hobbesian notion that the government is obliged to provide protection and
public forums for all its citizens; any failure to provide as much for any salient group of
citizens would, in Hobbes’s view, justify its departure or even rebellion, as the social contract was nullified for those in the group. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 197–98, § 222 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689) (expanding the role of government to include the protection of private property and opining that a regime attacking citizens’ property rights
would justify the people in “resum[ing] their original liberty”).
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 4–5 (1994) (articulating the historically recognized need to
avoid pure majoritarianism); Robert A. Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, 10 COMP. POL. 191, 201
(1978) (noting that “a search ought to be made for mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable outcomes” between the majority and minority); Michael Parenti, Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom, 32 J. POL. 501, 530 (1970) (implying it would be desirable
for less stratification to exist in society).
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In making this argument, I recognize that the Framers did not have
the same understanding of pluralism or even the groups that we have
today. My argument is only that the broad precepts of what we would
call democratic pluralism are instinct in the Constitution’s structure
and were explicitly invoked to support its ratification.
In the 1780s, Americans would not have conceptualized groups as
we do today, and the pertinent categories would have been different.
Rather than the race-based group categories that we consider important nowadays, early Americans would have considered conflicting
groups to fall along these lines of political cleavage: regional and
state loyalties and rivalries; religious identities and antimonies (like
Protestant versus Catholic); and economic and social class divisions,
as between debtors and creditors, merchants and farmers, and the
like. Irrelevant to American politics in 1789 would have been persons
of African descent, Native Americans, women, and men who did not
have either land or money. In our modern eyes, none of these exclusions is defensible, but they defined American politics—and American constitutionalism—at the time of the Framing.
Once groups are understood in this way, a fundamental commitment of the Constitution becomes clear: policy decisions affecting
these salient groups will be made by legislators elected by voters
drawn from these groups or, in the case of the United States Senate,
elected by the States themselves. For national law, this commitment
is made by Article I, Section 7 (the bicameralism and presentment
requirements for federal statutes) and the Supremacy Clause in Article VI. For state law, this commitment is made by Article IV’s guaran4
tee of a “Republican Form of Government.”
The most prominent defenders of the Constitution understood
that a representative democracy could be selectively oppressive. In
James Madison’s terms, factions, which are temporary alliances of various groups, will tend to gang up on minorities such as property owners, an important group in the Lockean pluralism of the eighteenth
5
century. The Framers knew their European history, which had many
examples of a majority imposing its religious views on minority religions. This was always a disaster for the country in question—whether
it was the England of Bloody Mary (1553–58) or the France of Louis
XIV (1685). Governmental policies marginalizing or persecuting
minorities were disastrous for democracy because (in modern par-

4
5

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Specific
page references to the Federalist will be to the 1961 Clinton Rossiter edition.
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lance) they raised the stakes of politics, fed private inter-group bitterness, and drove minority groups away from politics. As Madison put
it shortly before the Philadelphia Convention, “equality . . . ought to
be the basis of every law,” and the law should not subject some per6
sons to “peculiar burdens” or grant others “peculiar exemptions.”
Madison and his then-ally Alexander Hamilton recognized factional politics as a serious threat to the whole enterprise of American
government, and their Constitution articulated three different kinds
of protections against the permanent marginalization and oppression
of important property, religious, and other groups. Most of the protections were structural. The main idea was that the Constitution’s
separation of powers in Articles I through III would head off “unjust
7
and partial laws,” to use Hamilton’s phrase.
First, the Framers expected that Article I, Section 7 would instantiate deliberative politics with wide-ranging group input before legislatures could create new statutes. No national statute could be enacted
unless it was approved in the same form by: (1) the popularly elected
House of Representatives; (2) the Senate, whose members were chosen by state legislatures; and (3) the President, the national executive
official. The existence of these vetogates, each with a different electoral constituency, gave some assurance to the politically relevant minorities (i.e., property owners and the States themselves) that statutes
burdening them would be subject to scrutiny in three differently constituted bodies. Madison famously argued that “[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition,” by which he meant that separation of
powers and federalism assured minorities of different situses for op8
posing partial and unjust laws. Deliberative politics at the state level
was, theoretically, the promise of the Guarantee Clause in Article IV.
Second, the Framers believed that the system of checks and balances would protect minorities. The fact that statutory interpretation
(Article III) and enforcement (Article II) were in the hands of officials different from those creating the statutory duties had two virtues. One was that law application by different institutions created
incentives for legislators to adopt wise and temperate laws, as burdensome discriminatory statutes could be turned against the groups
sponsoring them. Another virtue was that the judiciary would directly
9
nullify “unjust and partial laws” through narrow interpretation or
6
7
8
9

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 2
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (1785).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 470.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 322.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 470.
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even constitutional invalidation. Following that idea, nineteenth century state judges developed a jurisprudence trimming back and sometimes invalidating “partial” laws applying “special” benefits or obliga10
tions on certain groups. Although not as important as the structural
protection, the Constitution also contained a few specific protections,
chiefly the bar to bills of attainder by both federal and state legisla11
tures.
Third, the Framers believed that the constitutional structure would
help ensure the perseverance of liberty for all groups. The vetogates
implicated in Article I, Section 7 meant that it would be very hard for
the federal government to create new legal burdens without significant public need. As Hamilton emphasized, the judiciary would provide a neutrality that would reassure minorities—especially landowners, merchants, and minority religions—that they could not be
12
unfairly burdened. Madison’s emphasis was federalism: the existence of state centers of power would provide a “double security” for
13
everyone’s liberty and keep the national Congress honest.
B. The Bill of Rights, 1791
Opponents of the Constitution maintained that the structural protections extolled by Madison and Hamilton were insufficient to protect minorities against unfair or even persecutory legislation. Their
arguments had enough traction to impel Federalists supporting the
Constitution to promise supplementation of the Constitution with
rights-conferring provisions. True to their word, the Federalists delivered on their promise with the Bill of Rights, which was ratified by
the States by 1791. Their rights-conferring strategy reaffirmed and
deepened the Framers’ original pluralism-facilitating ideas, discussed
14
above.
10

11

12
13
14

See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 247 (1997) (noting that state courts adopted a doctrine against partial or special laws). Some early state constitutions had explicit assurances along these lines. E.g.,
PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), § V (“[G]overnment is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or
community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or sett [sic] of men, who are a part only of that community . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from enacting bills of attainder); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (outlining a similar bar applicable to state legislatures, but also
including ex post facto laws and bills creating titles of nobility).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 469.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 323.
On the regime created by the Bill of Rights, see generally AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
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The authors and ratifiers of these first ten amendments fully accepted the Constitution’s premises that public policy is created primarily through statutes adopted by the people’s elected representatives in the legislature and that all salient groups would be
encouraged to take their fights and their agendas into the arena of
legislative politics. Likewise, they accepted the three precepts above
for protecting minority interests, but supplemented the Constitution’s structural strategy for assuring a healthy pluralism with a rights
strategy; their expectation, of course, was that the two strategies
would be mutually reinforcing.
First, the Framers of the Bill of Rights created explicit rights allowing citizens to mobilize themselves politically, and thereby have an influence on legislative and other government deliberations contemplated by Article I, Section 7 and the Guarantee Clause. This was an
important, and perhaps the primary, inspiration for the First
Amendment’s protections for free speech, petitioning the govern15
ment, and freedom of assembly. Hence, the deliberation entailed in
republican law creation would be informed by popular input and
feedback. The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual’s right to bear arms, in part
16
as an insurance against oppressive legislation.
Second, the Framers of the Bill of Rights provided explicit rightsconferring protections for minorities against discriminatory statutes
or implementation. Recall that, for these Framers, the most salient
“minorities” were creditors, property owners, and religious minorities. Creditors and property owners were subject to confiscatory statutes, and the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment was a protection for their interests: their property could not be taken except for a
“public use” and must be accompanied by just compensation. Religious minorities, the objects of the most stakes-raising politics in Europe and England in the early modern period, were the beneficiaries
of the Constitution’s first elaborate minority-protection scheme: the
Free Exercise Clause barred the federal government from persecuting religious minorities, and the Anti-Establishment Clause barred
the federal government from creating a state religion such as the

15

Although not a work of history, for the best statement of the First Amendment, see
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

16

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008) (explicating the Second
Amendment’s history to support the notion that an armed citizenry was an important assurance of popular liberties against government oppression).
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Church of England, which could force minorities to support a relig17
ion they found odious.
Third, the Bill of Rights expanded the Constitution’s libertarian
protections with an enforceable Due Process Clause in the Fifth
Amendment (which, like the other provisions, only applied to the
federal government). That provision has traditionally been read to
assure minority persons a fair hearing before an impartial judge before the State could deprive them of life, liberty, or property. If the
federal government went after such persons in a criminal proceeding,
the rights protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments kicked in, making it much more difficult for the federal
government to invoke the State’s most serious sanctions in these circumstances.
C. Reconstruction Amendments, 1866–1871
In the two generations between the Constitution of 1789 and Reconstruction, the United States changed dramatically. The biggest
social change was the creation of a potentially important new social
group—namely, the slaves, who were freed by the Emancipation
Proclamation (1863) and the Thirteenth Amendment (1866). The
Reconstruction Framers believed that these new African American
citizens would immediately be subject to discrimination and even
persecution by former slave States. Thus, the immediate purpose of
the Reconstruction Amendments was pluralistic: to integrate citizens
of color into the body politic and head off the tendency of the former
slave States to go after citizens of color with “partial and unjust laws”
18
that would have made Hamilton blanch.
Early drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly focused on
the freed slaves or racial minorities, but none of these drafts gained
enough political traction to advance in Congress. Instead, the text
that Congress sent to the States for ratification was non-raced; its provisions were phrased generally, and the expectation of the Framers
was that their individual rights protections would not be limited to

17

18

For a general discussion along these lines, see ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES (1990).
On the politics of the Abolitionists and their connection with the Reconstruction
Amendments, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); JACOBUS
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951).
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19

persons of color. More important, the Reconstruction Framers saw
themselves as elaborating upon the already-existing constitutional
structure and expanding it to protect a new cluster of social groups
against state, and not just federal, oppression. Unlike the 1789 and
1791 Framers, the Reconstruction Framers were not focused on
property-owning or religious minorities, whose protection they took
for granted; they wanted to extend the Constitution to protect the
new African American citizens against the southern Black Codes that
threatened to reduce them to slave status despite the Thirteenth
Amendment’s restrictions on doing so. The class legislation focus
was not limited to the Black Codes and theoretically included any
kind of law that took rights or property from Group A to benefit
20
Group B without any serious advancement of the public interest.
As the Bill of Rights had done in 1791, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 created rights-based protections that contributed to the
constitutional project of supporting pluralist democracy by ensuring
deliberation involving a variety of groups, protecting minorities
against majority overreaching, and guaranteeing core liberties against
rash invasion.
First, the Reconstruction Amendments gave bite to the participatory precept underlying the unenforceable Guarantee Clause. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment barred the States from denying certain “privileges or immunities” to their own citizens. The
Privileges or Immunities Clause was probably intended to extend the
First Amendment protections for free speech and press, assembly and
21
petition, and religious freedom to the States.
The Fifteenth
Amendment, barring the States from denying citizens the vote on account of race, was meant to head off the likely effort of southern
States to close off their legislatures from the influence of the freed
slaves.
Second, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a new equality obligation upon the States. What was
the nature of that obligation? Senator Jacob Howard (who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate) said that the pur19

20
21

Saunders, supra note 10, at 276–85 (tracing the drafting history of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, from early drafts focusing on race to the more generally phrased
drafts that formed the basis for the amendment ultimately proposed by Congress).
NELSON, supra note 18, at 176–78; Saunders, supra note 10, at 271–93.
See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1051, 1081–82 (2000) (proposing a reassessment of history to determine whether and to
what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applies the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to
the States). To be sure, the matter remains much disputed.
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pose of the Equal Protection Clause was to abolish “all class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of subjecting one
22
caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.” This view was
widely shared among the sponsors and supporters of the Fourteenth
23
Amendment in both Congress and the ratifying legislatures. Such a
purpose went beyond race-based class legislation, but the 1868 Framers were not precise, and probably not of one mind, in laying out
24
precisely what the language permitted and what it prohibited.
Third, the Due Process Clause expanded the libertarian/neutrality
precept to state governments. (Recall that the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause applied only to the federal government.) Senator Howard’s class legislation idea was also linked to the Due Process
Clause, partly because the notion of a neutral rule of law is naturally
akin to an aversion to special legislation, and partly because some
state court judges based their class legislation cases on state due
25
process clauses.

22

23

24
25

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); accord
id. at 174 (statement of Rep. James Wilson) (stating that in republican government, there
can be “no class legislation” and no laws that “legislate against [one class] . . . for the purpose of advancing the interests” of another class).
See Saunders, supra note 10, at 285–93 (examining in detail both congressional and ratification debates supporting the idea that the core goal of the Equal Protection Clause was
to codify the antebellum state cases invalidating special and partial laws).
On the confusion of the 1868 Framers’ expectations, see NELSON, supra note 18, at 176–
78.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (announcing the no-class-legislation principle as reflected in the latter two clauses of Section 1); Saunders, supra note 10, at 286–87.
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TABLE 1. THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION AND PLURALISM

Value

Constitution
of 1789

Bill of
Rights, 1791

Reconstruction Amendments, 1866–
71

Participation
and
Deliberation

Guarantee
Clause, art. IV;
Bicameralism &
Presentment,
art. I, § 7

Free Speech,
etc., I Amend.;
Armed Citizens,
II Amend.;
Jury, VI–VIII
Amends.

Privileges or
Immunities
Clause,
XIV Amend.;
Right to Vote,
XV Amend.

Minority
Protection

Separation of
Powers;
Federalism;
No Bills of
Attainder

Religion
Clauses,
I Amend.;
Takings Clause,
V Amend.

No Involuntary
Servitude,
XIII Amend.;
Equal Protection
Clause,
XIV Amend.

Independent
Judiciary,
art. III, § 1

Due Process
Clause,
V Amend;
Criminal
Procedure,
IV, V, VI & VII
Amends.

Due Process
Clause,
XIV Amend.

Libertarian
Neutrality

Table 1 maps the Constitution’s pluralism-facilitating provisions.
Note that the constitutional guarantees expanded along three dimensions:
from structural protections to inclusion of rightsconferring provisions; from particular rights (such as religion) to
more generalized rights statements; and from guarantees applicable
solely to the federal government to those applicable to the States. As
the sociology of groups changed, and as the American experience
developed, the Constitution expanded. Its expansion was sedimentary, as the old protections remained even as new protections were
added. This Article only focuses on the minority protection provisions, and the Equal Protection Clause in particular, but this part of
the Constitution needs to be understood in light of the larger constitutional picture.
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My argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment updated and
generalized the pluralism-protective features of the Constitution.
Specifically, constitutionalizing the no-class-legislation principle of
the Jackson era, the Equal Protection Clause sets boundaries on the
dynamic process of lawmaking to assure that it will be pluralismfacilitating. The meta-purpose of constitutional equality protections
is to encourage both established and emerging groups to want to participate in the democratic political process and not want to drop out.
II. A PLURALISM-FACILITATING THEORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION
REVIEW
This Part moves from the structural constitutional history examined above to a workable and realistic theory relating the Equal Protection Clause and constitutional history to the relationship between
government and social groups. The constitutional history, including
notions grounded upon original meaning, plays three important
roles in my theory. First, the history provides a conceptual purpose
for the Equal Protection Clause: the bar to “class legislation.” What
does that mean, as applied to modern circumstances? This is obviously a harder project, but the difficulty is an inevitable one and so
cannot be ignored or facilely glossed over. My theory for developing
the consequences of the no-class-legislation purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause rests upon the pluralistic meta-purpose of the Constitution itself: the State must provide security for all salient social
groups and must provide a sufficient incentive for all such groups to
26
advance their agendas within the forums provided by the State.
Second, the history provides three different, and mutually reinforcing, constitutional corollaries that help assure conditions conducive to a flourishing democratic pluralism: open deliberation where a
wide variety of groups participate, a presumption of equal treatment
and minority protection, and neutrality with a libertarian bias. Structurally, therefore, I read the Fourteenth Amendment not only in light
of its generative debates, but also in light of the Constitution’s longer
history. I would link the Equal Protection Clause not only with Reconstruction’s larger project of integrating citizens of color into
American politics, but also with the Bill of Rights’ project of respecting religious pluralism through both a free exercise right and an antiestablishment norm. Reasoning by analogy from the Religion Claus-

26

For background, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
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es as well as the anti-Black Code feature of the Equal Protection
Clause provides a law-based mechanism for applying the generally
phrased latter clause to other groups.
Third, the history suggests anchors that can be starting points for
the process of reasoning by historical analogy to modern circumstances. Accordingly, my theory understands equal protection playing different roles depending upon the status of the social group. A
pluralistic democracy enjoys a dynamic relationship with social
groups, which are themselves evolving. I focus on the important pluralist phenomenon of social groups that go through the following cycle, from: (1) irrelevance, when society views their defining traits as
malignant variations from the norm; to (2) visibility but marginality,
when society views their defining traits as tolerable but inferior variations from the norm; to (3) full participation, when society views
their variations as benign and there is no single norm. Each stage in
the cycle provides a background norm against which the no-classlegislation principle can be applied. History provides examples the
Framers considered core illustrations of the no-class-legislation principle, and these examples enable us to reason by analogy to modern
circumstances.
Reading the no-class-legislation purpose through the lens of pluralist theory generates the following rough typology for applying the
Equal Protection Clause to new and unforeseen cases:
• State distinctions will not be class legislation if they reflect a
natural distinction whose legal recognition serves the public interest. Thus, the 1868 Framers did not consider women to be a
politically relevant group, even though many women themselves
27
objected to that understanding. The general idea is that where
there is no socially recognized, and pluralistically important,
group penalized by state distinctions, there is little work for the
Equal Protection Clause to do. Following the Framers, the Supreme Court for generations treated statutory sex discriminations as not presenting strong equal protection concerns.
• The no-class-legislation principle has much more bite once a
group is accepted as politically relevant, even if it remains socially marginal. This was precisely the status of the freed slaves;
even most Republicans believed that black citizens were inferior
to white citizens. But the goal of Reconstruction was to inte-

27

See Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,”
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1475 (2001) (noting women’s rights groups’ opposition to the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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grate these new citizens into American politics, and the Equal
Protection Clause contributed to that purpose by legitimizing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and overriding the Black Codes. Although the Framers decidedly felt that law could reflect racebased distinctions, such as the remedial program of the Freedman’s Bureau, they wanted to override any such race legislation
28
that entrenched black citizens as a subordinate caste.
The
general idea is that a marginal but politically relevant group
must be tolerated and cannot be subject to legislation that seeks
to entrench an outcaste status for that group.
• The no-class-legislation principle has the most bite for minority
groups that have become socially accepted participants in our
pluralist democracy; this was the goal for African Americans in
the twentieth century. This was more or less the status of minority religions in 1868, and the Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Religion Clauses to the States.
Where the public law background norm was benign variation, as
it was for religion, the State could not openly discriminate at all.
My suggestion is that, for a minority group fully accepted in the
pluralist heaven, the no-class-legislation principle merges into
the free exercise and anti-establishment principles. Precisely,
legislation penalizing a salient group in favor of the majority is
class legislation in the free exercise sense, while legislation providing special benefits for the majority group alone is class legislation in the establishment sense.
Consider these stages of a group’s normative status in our polity in
greater detail; in the course of discussion, I shall use sexual minorities
29
as a template for applying these basic ideas.
A. Stage One: Libertarian and Deliberation-Participatory Protections
Anybody can announce himself a member of a group, and Americans can be classified, and self-classified, in myriad ways. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as those of the Bill of
Rights, did not understand their protections as applying to any conceivable “class” of Americans; my theory identifies a limiting princi28

29

See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment,
71 VA. L. REV. 753, 755 (1985) (noting that Congress rejected various race limitations in
social welfare programs).
For a more comprehensive look at how the law treats sexual minorities, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) [hereinafter
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW], and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS].
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ple. In policing “special” or “partial” legislation, the Equal Protection
Clause ought to focus on groups that are socially and politically relevant as players in our democratic-pluralist politics. A social group is
not politically relevant when society understands its defining trait to
be a malignant variation. Just as alcoholics and child molesters are
politically irrelevant today (they might be understood as “groups” but
are not recognized political players), so were cross-dressers and “degenerates” (later called “inverts” or “perverts” or “sexual variants”) in
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Putting it another way, degenerates et al. were considered regulatory objects and
not subjects by those who held power in 1868, just as those who hold
power today do not consider alcoholics a legitimate social group that
is a legitimate player in the pluralist political process. Hence, legislation singling out “degenerates” or “perverts” for sterilization, as a
number of jurisdictions did in the early twentieth century, did not in
30
that period (as in 1868) mobilize serious equal protection concerns.
The Equal Protection Clause is concerned with politically relevant
groups, and so its bite is going to be weak for persons who are not
members of a recognized group—but that does not mean that outcasts from politics do not concern a pluralist theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Quite the contrary, as the 1789, 1791, and 1868 Framers all recognized, a source of the dynamism of pluralist politics is the
emergence of new politically salient groups. Pluralist theory demands that the State remain neutral and open to the emergence and
salience of new social groups, and the Fourteenth Amendment protects this process at the state level.
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment insists that the State provide
“due process” to all persons, however squalid society deems them to
be. A social leper in 1868 (the degenerate) may be part of a thriving
and widely accepted social group in 2009 (the gay community). A
State that imprisons and executes a social pariah without evidence of
serious wrongdoing, with evidence procured through illegal means,
without allowing the person to cross-examine witnesses against him,
or through a corrupt process where the decisionmakers prejudged
his guilt because of his pariah status, is no better than a dictatorship
and is antithetical to the Constitution generally and the Due Process
Clauses in particular. Due process reflects the Constitution’s libertarian bias, and it is a bias that applies to the squalid miscreant, the innocent outsider, and the respectable citizen alike.

30

E.g., 1909 Cal. Stat. 1093–94 (permitting the sterilization of “moral and sexual pervert[s]”).
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The Fourteenth Amendment has also been read to guarantee pariahs something more positive, namely, the right to protest their status, to publish materials seeking tolerance from the majority, and to
form political groups to seek legal changes through legislation, ad31
ministrative change, and so forth. While nine pariahs out of ten
may be usefully treated as marginal, the tenth one may be the germ
of a group to come—and it is imperative that the State induce all ten
pariahs to make their case within the pluralist system rather than going underground or otherwise moving outside of the system.
Although the Equal Protection Clause provided no protection
(equal or otherwise) for degenerate, inverted, perverted, or homosexual Americans for most of our history, even these despised and
feared persons enjoyed significant constitutional protections against
government oppression. For a dramatic example, between 1946 and
1961, state and federal governments created an anti-homosexual regime that precisely paralleled the one created by Nazi Germany in
the previous period (1933–1945)—yet America’s anti-homosexual
Kulturkampf never became a Nazi-like Holocaust (a mass imprisonment, torture, and extermination of homosexuals as well as Jews and
gypsies), in part because of the recognized constitutional due process
32
and free speech protections enjoyed even by accused homosexuals.
This is to be celebrated not just for humanistic reasons, but also for
pluralism-based reasons: a persecutorial society is one that invites internal corruption, undermines opportunities for social cooperation,
and creates political anger and dangers of retaliation.
B. Stage Two: No Class Legislation (Narrow Sweep)
The admonition against class legislation has some bite for social
groups that are junior partners in America’s great and (after 1850)
rapidly expanding pluralist pantheon. By junior partners, I mean
that the minority has emerged as a coherent social group, and the

31

32

The protections in text were originally understood as falling within the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Jacob Howard) (noting the amendment “relates to the privileges and immunities of citizens”), but the Supreme Court relocated these protections into the Due Process Clause.
E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying the First Amendment to the
States under the aegis of the Due Process Clause).
See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 29, at 57–97 (discussing “how post-World War II American law went much further than prewar law to suppress gay subculture and how antigay
Kulturkampf (state war of subcultural suppression) contributed to the closet”). See generally Richard A. Posner, Ask, Tell, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1999, at 52 (analyzing Eskridge’s
account of “gaylaw,” the law’s treatment of homosexuals and other “gender nonconformists,” in the book, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET, supra note 29).
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majority considers the group’s trait to be a tolerable and not malignant variation. This was the normative step taken for blacks by Reconstruction; even Republicans who harbored racist views that blacks
were inferior to whites believed that racial variation was tolerable and
ought not be the basis for class legislation suppressing blacks. Likewise, “homosexuals” evolved into “gays” in large northern cities in the
1960s and 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that most Americans
came to view homosexuality as a tolerable (but still icky) variation
from the norm.
From a pluralist perspective, the emergence of a new social group
clamoring for inclusion in ordinary politics is occasion for both celebration and concern. That gay people took their case for decent
treatment to local and state legislatures and judges is exactly what
makes pluralist democracy a great engine for adjusting politics to new
social dynamics. And the success of gay people sends an affirming
signal to the next social groups. But even as established groups are
forced to deal with the new one, they can be expected to push back
and reassert traditional statuses in the face of new challenges. Sometimes the majority groups push back too hard. Where should the line
be drawn? In retrospect, most of us now believe that the first Justice
Harlan, rather than the Court, got the line right in Plessy v. Ferguson,
33
for example.
A regime that thoroughly segregated blacks from
whites was class legislation even if one believed, as Harlan did, that
blacks were an inferior race: the fates of the different races are
linked, and apartheid not only fueled race-based animosity, but also
impeded cooperation and useful interaction among persons of dif34
ferent races.
For a more recent example, the response of America’s most traditionalist States to the emerging gay social group was to reaffirm the
notion that sodomy is a serious offense against society and should be
the basis for civil as well as criminal disabilities—but traditionalists
created a new crime of “homosexual” and not heterosexual sodomy,
lest their project affect married and other heterosexual Americans
who practice oral or anal sex. Hence, the Supreme Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick suggested (in the context of a completely nondiscriminatory
sodomy law) that the State could certainly criminalize homosexual,

33

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

34

See id. at 557–59 (objecting to the Court’s ratification of segregated railroad travel and
arguing that a forced separation of the races is bad politics because the fates of the two
races are interlinked).
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35

but probably not heterosexual, sodomy. The Court seventeen years
later overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas based upon a sea change in
36
America’s pluralist landscape : by 2003, gay people had graduated
from utter pariahs to a nervously accepted social group, and the
Court required Texas to follow the new consensus. Although it was
characterized as a due process opinion, Lawrence also exploited the
core goal of the Equal Protection Clause: the State cannot subject a
thriving social group to a network of legal exclusions and discrimina37
tions that push its members outside the normal channels of politics.
An earlier Supreme Court case also illustrates this precept. In
Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional
amendment that, read literally, sought not only to revoke antidiscrimination laws protecting gay people, but also to deny gay peo38
ple ordinary protections against mistreatment by the State. The
Colorado amendment echoed our country’s lengthy history of pervasive discrimination against, and violence toward, gay people—a link
the Court sought to disrupt. Correctly reading American political
culture to have moved from hostility as regards to “homosexuals,” toward a culture of tolerance, the Court essentially ruled that the
amendment was a queer version of the old Black Codes: an effort by
family values conservatives to consign “homosexuals” to be a perma39
nent underclass. Dissenting Justices made the logical point that this
reading of equal protection was inconsistent with Bowers, a notion the
40
Court followed seven years later when it formally overruled Bowers.
Other pluralism-protecting Supreme Court decisions support my
notion that the “class legislation” concern of the Equal Protection
Clause has been, and should be, read through the lens of democratic
pluralism. A harbinger of Romer was the Court’s decision in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., which invalidated the application of a zoning ordinance to close down a home for mentally dis41
abled persons. Pluralism-monitoring is on the face of the Court’s
35
36
37

38

39
40
41

478 U.S. 186 (1985). Bowers was analyzed in detail by ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS,
supra note 29, at ch. 8.
539 U.S. 558, 559–60 (2003).
Id. at 574–75 (recognizing the equal protection claim as tenable and closely linked to the
Court’s own privacy analysis); id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(invalidating the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law solely on equal protection grounds).
517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996). But see id. at 636–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (strongly disputing
the majority’s understanding of the Amendment 2’s plain meaning). See generally
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 29, at ch. 9 (analyzing the Supreme
Court’s “regime-shifting” opinion in Romer v. Evans).
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 630–35 (majority opinion).
Id. at 636–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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opinion, which recognized people with disabilities as a social group
that state and federal legislatures had recognized as a worthy part of
society, but without insisting upon completely equal treatment, because the identifying trait was one that did often bear on one’s capac42
ity for participation in politics, governance, and society. Nonetheless, the city’s harsh application of its zoning law struck the Court as
having no relationship to legitimate public policy concerns and was,
43
instead, a state implementation of private “prejudice.”
Cleburne
stands for the proposition that any law targeting a salient social group
because of prejudice is class legislation unacceptable under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Another example of class legislation is the Texas law struck down
44
in Plyler v. Doe. The law barred children of illegal aliens from receiv45
ing public education in the State. Although the law may have reflected prejudice, like the laws later invalidated in Cleburne and Romer,
the Court found particularly troubling the promise that such a law
would create a permanent “underclass” of young people (many of
whom were themselves citizens, because they were born here) denied
46
education and engagement in American society. There were plenty
of ways Texas could discriminate against illegal aliens, but excluding
the next generation of Americans (no longer “aliens”) from our culture is exactly the wrong way to discriminate. Again, the permanent
subordination of a potentially thriving social group might have reminded some of the Justices of the Reconstruction-era Black Codes.
C. Stage Three: No Class Legislation (Broader Sweep)
Gay people, persons with disabilities, and aliens as well as their
children are important social groups that the Equal Protection Clause
will sometimes protect, but most Americans still consider their variation from the norm at best tolerable, and far from benign or completely
normal. Most parents, for example, would be strongly disappointed,
and some would be hysterical, if their beloved daughter decided to
marry a lesbian, a disabled person, or the offspring of an (illegal)
alien. Advocates for such minority social groups want to persuade
those Americans that they are wrong: the lesbian, the differently ab-

42
43
44
45
46

See id. at 442–46.
Id. at 446–50; accord id. at 451–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing for a sliding-scale approach to equal protection).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 219–20; accord id. at 236–42 (Powell, J., concurring).
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led, or the progeny of an illegal visitor can be just as good a spouse as
the heterosexual, the fully able, or the progeny of a legal citizen. Indeed, such a person might actually be the very best spouse for this
particular daughter.
None of these groups has yet persuaded Middle America of such
normative claims, but other groups have been successful. The civil
rights and the women’s rights movements have persuaded Americans
that race and gender variation are benign and not just tolerable; race
or (usually) sex has no bearing on one’s ability to participate in the
workplace and other forums. Once their fellow Americans accepted
that proposition, and the former out-group became a political ingroup, the no-class-legislation principle demanded more than it did
in Romer, Cleburne, and Plyler. Once women and people of color assumed roles as salient social groups whose voices matter in America,
then any law that formally discriminates against those groups demands serious judicial scrutiny, as potential class legislation that takes
rights or property from one group to another without a sufficient justification in the public interest. Justices engage in intense debates
about what public interests justify sex or, especially, race classifications, but they are in accord that the State must advance strong justi47
fications.
The normative migration of a group’s trait from tolerable to benign status is a movement the Supreme Court can easily detect and
has done so in earlier regime shifts. Although opinion polls can be
useful confirmatory evidence, the usual barometer for a judicial audience is and ought to be widespread adoption of statutes to that effect. The adoption of statutes not only confirms the status of the
group as a normal player in the pluralist political arena, but also suggests that the group has persuaded super-majorities of their claims to
full participation and respect. Thus, the discrediting of race as a legitimate classification culminated in Loving v. Virginia, where the
48
Court struck down state laws barring different-race marriages. Although Americans today regard Loving as a constitutional gimme, it
was in fact rendered so only after Congress had adopted antidiscrimination super-statutes in 1964 (the Civil Rights Act) and 1965
(the Voting Rights Act), and all the States outside the South had re-

47

E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that government racial classifications must be analyzed by reviewing courts under strict scrutiny to evaluate the validity of
the government’s use of race in a certain context); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
531 (1996) (holding that the government must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” to defend sex discrimination).

48

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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49

pealed their own anti-miscegenation laws. Likewise, feminists won
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications only after they had
revealed their political muscle in a series of anti-discrimination laws
50
adopted by Congress in 1964 and 1972.
You do not need opinion polls to know that there has not been
such a normative shift as regards homosexuality or even physical disability. Most States still do not have anti-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation, and the laws that protect the disabled (such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) allow discrimination
51
for various social and business justifications.
Under a pluralistfacilitating theory, it would be a mistake for the Supreme Court to
consider these traits to be suspect classifications. Homosexuality will
in the foreseeable future likely be a trait that most Americans will
consider benign as a matter of public policy. And when that day
comes, there will be a federal anti-discrimination law, as well as similar policies at the state level. If that happens, the Supreme Court will
sweep away the remaining anti-homosexual discriminations.
Table 2 below maps out the constitutional rights practically available to different social groups (categorized according to the normative acceptability of a defining trait).

49

50

51

See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION
244–80 (2003) (detailing the repeal of and attack on antimiscegenation laws in the United States).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (arguing
for strict scrutiny for sex discrimination, based upon congressional legislation announcing that such discrimination ought to be illegitimate in our modern pluralistic democracy); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN
EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 202–04 (1975)
(noting 1971–72 as an annus mirabilis for the Equal Rights Amendment and a series of
important congressional sex discrimination statutes).
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW (2d ed. 2004) (providing an analysis of sexual orientation discrimination laws and
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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TABLE 2. THE DYNAMICS OF PLURALISM AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

Status of
Group in
American
Society

Marginal
(trait a
malignant
variation)

Emerging as
Salient
(tolerable
variation)

Fully
Participating
Group
(benign
variation)

Due Process
Protection
Criminal
procedure
important,
as group
members
are targeted
for criminal
prosecution
Criminal
procedure
protections
+ Privacy
rights
Criminal
procedure
protections
+ Privacy
rights

First
Amendment
Protection

Equal
Protection of
the Law

Potential First
Amendment
rights, albeit
uneven
judicial
enforcement

Little if any
scrutiny under
the Equal
Protection
Clause

Broad First
Amendment
rights, with judicial
enforcement
Full First
Amendment
rights, with judicial
enforcement
sometimes
against
minorities

Anti-Caste Idea:
Group cannot
be rendered
outlaws
Clean-Up:
Courts will clear
away
discriminations
not addressed
by political
process

III. DEFENSE AND APPLICATION OF A PLURALIST THEORY OF EQUAL
PROTECTION
A. Virtues of a Pluralist Theory of Equal Protection
I would claim three different kinds of virtues for the foregoing
pluralist theory of groups and the Fourteenth Amendment: rule of
law, democratic theory, and practicality.
To begin with, such a pluralist theory finds support in the evolving
structure of the Constitution and in the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, for the reasons suggested above. Indeed, a
pluralist theory has a better connection with structural and historical
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constitutional materials than John Hart Ely’s more aggressive theory
arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should protect “discrete
52
and insular minorities.” Stated somewhat differently, a pluralismfacilitating theory has the rule-of-law advantages of: (1) carrying out
the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner
consistent with (2) the constitutional structure and (3) other commitments of the constitutional deliberations, namely: (a) pragmatism, or an avoidance of mechanical rules and adoption of an adaptive approach; (b) caution, or an aversion to giving federal judges a
broad veto power over state legislation, and a deference to congressional judgments; and (c) political functionality, or a devotion to an
integrated United States where the stakes of politics do not get so
high that they drive groups out of the system.
In my view, a bigger advantage of pluralism-facilitating theory is
that it is responsive to a huge problem faced by all democracies: their
fragility when the emotional stakes get too high. Political scientists,
ranging from Adam Przeworski to Stephen Holmes to Lani Guinier,
warn us that pluralist democracy is fragile, in part because its stakes
53
tend to get out of hand. Certain that they are right about the important issues of the day, reigning majorities have a tendency to censor opposing views, to create ambitious legal regimes of exclusion for
some minorities they find obnoxious or distasteful, and to leave in
place obsolescent discriminations. These tendencies create unnecessary frictions in a pluralist democracy, and the theory outlined here
provides a modest antidote to these destructive tendencies.
Finally, pluralism-facilitating theory has a big advantage in that it
helps explain the Court’s eclectic case law—going well beyond racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities as the beneficiaries of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Court has invalidated laws that either
seek to create, or have the potential effect of creating, new outcaste

52

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980).
For important critiques of Ely’s theory, see, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), and Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory,
89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).

53

See GUINIER, supra note 3 (arguing that the winner-take-all approach to United States
elections creates a “tyranny of the majority”); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 202–08, 222–27 (1995) (discussing
the importance of gag rules in liberal democracies); PRZEWORSKI, supra note 1, at 19, 36–
37 (“Some institutions under certain conditions offer to the relevant political forces a
prospect of eventually advancing their interests that is sufficient to incite them to comply
with immediately unfavorable outcomes. Political forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their interests in the future.”).
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groups. This explains the Court’s limited interventions in Plyler
(children of illegal immigrants), Cleburne (people with disabilities),
54
and Romer v. Evans (gay people). Indeed, this theory helps explain
why the Court was right to reject a privacy argument for homosexual
sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick while recognizing such a right in Law55
rence v. Texas. In the former case, the Court was properly reluctant
to take the issue away from a volatile political process deeply skeptical
of homosexuality, while the latter case gave the Court an opportunity
to confirm the country’s regime shift away from treating homosexual56
ity as a malignant variation and toward treating it as a tolerable one.
My theory, or something like it, is probably the best explanation
of the Court’s sex discrimination cases. Today, the Court treats sex as
a (quasi) suspect classification, and almost all sex discriminations
have been invalidated. This regime has virtually no support in the
Constitution’s text and the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, and is in some tension with the defeat of the Equal Rights
Amendment. It is also contrary to representation-reinforcement theory, for women are neither a minority nor an insular group, and indeed their interests are well-represented in the political process.
What justifies the Court’s jurisprudence is pluralist democracy: women after 1945 have come to consider themselves a social group having
common interests and have demanded fair treatment by the American government. The Court did not take the lead in advancing women’s agenda of anti-discrimination laws, affirmative protections for violence against women, and family-supportive laws.
But once
legislators and executive officials took the lead and public feedback
supported those measures, then the Court swept away the primary
atavisms of the earlier period, when a woman’s place was, legally as
well as socially, in the home.
For this last reason in particular, pluralism-facilitating theory appeals to the Court’s own self-interest in ways that neither original
meaning nor representation-reinforcing theories can honestly accomplish. If the Court had upheld the dozens of sex-discriminatory
laws it struck down in the 1970s, as dictated by original meaning or
representation-reinforcing review, the Justices would have come under tremendous fire and the Court’s institutional legitimacy would
have taken a hit. The reason would have been that most people

54
55
56

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 29, at ch. 10 (discussing sodomy law in
the context of Lawrence v. Texas).
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would have thought it obvious that the literal guarantee that no State
shall deny “any person the equal protection of the laws” meant that
women could not be forced by the State to change their names upon
marriage, that women could not be excluded or even given an easy
exit from jury service, and so forth. More importantly, the Americans
whose views on such issues were the most intense tended to be those
who believed that such discriminations were core violations of their
rights as citizens—while most Americans who supported those discriminations felt less strongly. In those circumstances, where the
loudest voices would have condemned the Court and those supportive would have been muted or even silent, a string of decisions upholding blatant sex discriminations would have been a public relations disaster for the Court. Even Bowers v. Hardwick suffered from
this asymmetry, and a Court filled with conservative Republicans was
eager to overrule it.
Consider also how a pluralism-facilitating theory works in connection with several cutting-edge constitutional issues. By and large, pluralism-based theory urges caution on the part of the Supreme Court
in equal protection cases.
B. Same-Sex Marriage
There are many constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage,
and I have written in favor of all of them as a matter of reasoning
from Supreme Court precedent and from the original purpose of the
57
Equal Protection Clause. I think these are persuasive arguments, yet
for the most part they are better addressed to legislatures and state
judges rather than to the United States Supreme Court. The issue is
far from ripe for Supreme Court review—and a nationwide judicially
imposed requirement of marriage recognition would be a train wreck
in a polity where Congress, almost all state legislatures, and dozens of
state constitutions have legislated, repeatedly, that marriage is a un58
ion between one man and one woman.
The central idea of pluralist democracy, fully embedded in the
Constitution, is the notion that elected representatives, accountable
to the people, are the chief agents for making fundamental changes
57

58

See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT, at chs. 5–6 (1996) (discussing the arguments in favor
of same-sex marriage in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and Loving v. Virginia).
For an up-to-date survey of state bars to same-sex marriage, see Lambda Legal’s website,
Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/
articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited May 8, 2009).
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in public policy. Recognizing same-sex marriages would be such a
fundamental change, and it would be folly for judges to advance such
a change without any legislative cooperation. (The Clinton-era Defense of Marriage Act represented Congress’s and the President’s
strong opposition to such a change.) The central threat to pluralist
democracy, indirectly recognized in the Constitution, is the possibility
of the stakes being raised in ways that drive groups from politics; one
way that the stakes of politics get too high is premature termination
of public debate about an issue of deep concern to different groups.
Given today’s public opinion, judicial recognition of same-sex marriage would immediately raise the stakes of politics because it would
effectively frustrate the successful efforts of traditional family values
of Americans who seek to protect their old-fashioned understanding
of marriage against modernization (and, in their view, degradation).
Constitutionalizing the right prematurely would radicalize many of
these Americans. Unless, of course, they were able to secure a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage—and then gayfriendly America would be embittered and radicalized.
The best argument for same-sex marriage under my theory is this
one: because civil marriage entails hundreds of related legal duties
and rights, the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from this legal
institution discriminates against those couples as regards to hundreds
of rights and duties. Is this class legislation the core objective of the
Equal Protection Clause’s searching scrutiny? In my view, no. To begin with, most of the legal incidents of marriage can be created by
contract, including support and fidelity obligations, inheritance
rights, power of attorney, decision-making rights in the event of a
partner’s injury or death, joint ownership of property, and so forth.
Civil marriage provides all these rights and duties without the need
for private contracting, which is usually a great advantage, but as a
formal matter of law, a large majority of the incidents of marriage are
available to lesbian and gay couples.
By the way, a generation ago many States denied enforcement of
contracts and wills involving lesbian and gay couples, usually because
59
their relationship was founded on felonious sodomy. Now that the
Supreme Court has swept away consensual sodomy laws, and established tolerable sexual variation as the constitutional floor, this old
regime has disappeared as a matter of open state policy. If there are
59

E.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
225 (1981) (arguing that a homosexual testator bequeathing to his lover has a greater
risk of having his testamentary plans overturned after death than a heterosexual testator
giving to a spouse).
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States that still effectively deny lesbian and gay people basic rights of
inheritance, joint property ownership, and contracting, then a pluralism-facilitating theory strongly supports equal protection claims. The
Equal Protection Clause was adopted, at the very least, to assure that
state as well as federal courts are available for ordinary contract and
property claims.
There are some rights that cannot be created by contract, such as
the right of the surviving partner to sue for her own injuries in tort
cases, but they are many fewer than the former group. It is notable
that (as of May 2009) eleven States and the District of Columbia provide most of these noncontractable rights to lesbian and gay couples,
through statewide marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnership.
All but one of these States are in the Northeast and West Coast portions of our country, the two regions where our polity has moved toward the norm that homosexuality is a benign variation and there is
60
no single norm for sexuality. A pluralism-facilitating theory of those
state constitutions would support a claim that the State must provide
61
some legal institution for lesbian and gay couples.
But for the nation as a whole, a pluralism-facilitating theory insists
upon a wide berth for public deliberation. So long as this identityinvested issue divides the country both intensely and evenly, there
62
should be no national resolution. And there should be constitutional tolerance for a variety of alternatives, such as civil unions. Are
these not, critics maintain, just like apartheid, a “separate but equal”
regime fundamentally at odds with the Equal Protection Clause, es63
pecially as construed in Romer? From a pluralism perspective, that is
an absurd argument. Apartheid was a regime of strict separation of
the races, generated by prejudice and enforced with violence. Civil
unions are a huge step toward integration of lesbian and gay couples
into the larger polity, not a separation. Indeed, civil unions and domestic partnerships are a kind of “equality practice” that helps prepare the way for normalization of homosexuality in polities that have

60
61

62

63

Lambda Legal, supra note 58.
E.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (requiring the legislature to create an institutional form to provide lesbian and gay couples with the legal incidents of marriage, but
not necessarily the name).
See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93–99 (expanded ed. 1956) (arguing that a “polyarchy” needs to minimize situations where big issues divide the polity
both evenly and intensely).
See MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE (2004) (arguing, by an openly straight
author, that civil unions are an unacceptable “separate but equal” regime).
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adopted those compromises through their legislative processes, after
64
deliberation and public accountability.
Moreover, civil unions serve as a potential bridge between gay
people and social conservatives. They are a compromise that allows
each group what it most desires: civil support for same-sex partnerships (the primary need for lesbian and gay Americans), but without
invoking the hallowed institution of marriage (a point of greatest
concern for social conservatives). More importantly, civil unions constitute a compromise that is also a social experiment, for they create a
growing population of quasi-married lesbian and gay couples, often
with families. After experience with civil unions, will the gay rights
movement still insist on marriage? Will social conservatives find that
gay relationships have the adverse effects predicted for society?
C. Voluntary Race-Conscious Integration School Plans
Another form of equality practice has been going on in local
school boards for the last generation. Disappointed that public
schools remain largely segregated by race decades after Brown, parents, administrators, and experts have been devising plans to integrate or reintegrate schools. Such plans usually include race-based
criteria. For example, Seattle School District No. 1 sought a better
racial mix for its ten high schools and, to that end, developed new
pupil assignment criteria. The main sorting mechanism was parental
choice, but one of the tiebreakers when too many parents opted for a
popular school was to prefer pupils whose race would contribute to
that school’s racial diversity. Concerned parents sued the school district on the ground that the race-based tiebreaker violated the Equal
Protection Clause. A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court agreed and
struck down the plan in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
65
School District No. 1.
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion for a plurality of Justices has
been faulted for disrupting the democratic process without firm support in standard legal sources, namely, constitutional text, original
66
meaning, and precedent. Like other Supreme Court opinions over-
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See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS (2002) (arguing for “equality practice,” incremental and often legislatively driven
change, as a way to ensure legal rights and equal treatment by the State for same-sex couples).
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746–68 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2788–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 2800–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting a scorched-earth assault on the Chief
Justice’s factual assumptions and legal reasoning).
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turning remedial race-based programs, Parents Involved can also be
criticized for treating a helping hand the same as the back of the
hand across the face. Justice Stevens once put the point this way:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression,
subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the
majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse:
67
a desire to foster equality in society.

Justice Stevens’s point is consistent with the original purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause; what my theory adds is that Parents Involved is in tension with the pluralistic themes in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Constitution of 1789, and the Bill of Rights. Thus,
the Seattle plan seems like the precise obverse of the “class legislation” that was the Equal Protection Clause’s core purpose to monitor.
Unlike class legislation, which was traditionally partial and exclusionary, the Seattle plan was inclusive and embracing. Unlike class legislation, which was often a mechanism for entrenching a social group
as an underclass, the Seattle plan sought to reverse trends which
threatened some communities of color with becoming an underclass.
(The contrast with Plyler v. Doe could hardly be more striking.) Unlike class legislation, which was traditionally engineered by a majority
group to enhance its own power, the Seattle plan was engineered by a
pluralist multi-racial coalition of educators, parents, and elected
school board members who were genuinely seeking the public interest. Speaking for a majority of breast-beating, original-meaning Jus-
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
generally Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (arguing “for a large expansion of our current commitment to cultural diversity on the ground that law schools are political institutions”); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1327 (1986) (concluding that “affirmative action should generally be retained as a tool of
public policy because, on balance, it is useful in overcoming entrenched racial hierarchy,”
and arguing that “division within the civil rights coalition is not the only conflict permeating the affirmative action controversy”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986) (“[T]he Court has
approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed in the past.”); Patricia J. Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV.
525 (1990) (assessing the significance of Metro Broadcasting in regard to group claims, and
analyzing the “costs of pitting individual rights against group interests at a moment in our
history when such groupings as race and class intersect so that race increasingly defines
class and the property interests of large numbers of white individuals are understood to
be in irreconcilable tension with the collective dispossession of large numbers of people
of color”).
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tices, the Chief Justice’s opinion was conspicuous in its historical amnesia.
My theory suggests a greater appreciation, however, for Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion. (The Chief Justice spoke for the
Court in striking down the Seattle plan, but not as to all the points of
equal protection analysis.) On the one hand, Justice Kennedy agreed
with the four dissenters that diversity, as well as remedying the effects
68
of past discrimination, can justify some race-based preferences. My
pluralism-facilitating theory of equal protection strongly supports that
point and would insist that a stable majority of the Court adhere to it
in subsequent cases. But my theory also takes a critical point from
Justice Kennedy: race is a sensitive criterion, and the Seattle plan in
particular used the criterion crudely, categorizing everyone as white
or nonwhite and ignoring other criteria that would have yielded
greater diversity than a criterion grounded upon a crude racial sort69
ing. For example, under the Seattle plan a school, where 60% of
the students had Northern European ancestry and 40% African ancestry, would be considered just as diverse as a school with 60%
Northern European, 20% Latino, 5% African, and 5% Asian ancestries. Justice Kennedy was right to be concerned about such a plan.
He also worried that the Seattle plan yielded no more, and perhaps
less, diversity than a plan considering students’ economic backgrounds.
A pluralism-facilitating reading of Parents Involved would emphasize the features of the case that troubled Justice Kennedy. Such a
reading is supported not only by ordinary principles of precedent,
which would view Justice Kennedy’s opinion as the controlling one
on these disputed points of law, but also principles of pluralism. If
there is a silver lining from Parents Involved (this remains to be seen),
it is that school boards should be encouraged to create more constructive plans that invite a more pluralistic public school system not
dominated by pure race-based preferences.
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Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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Id. at 2792–97.

